Few experts endorse the idea that the police “had nothing to do with it,” as the Seattle protester claimed, but the link between the number of cops and the number of crimes seems hazier than ever. The low point in violent crime has arrived even though large police departments employed 6 percent fewer officers going into 2025 than they did at the beginning of 2020, according to a survey by the Police Executive Research Forum. Though they were mostly not in fact defunded, police forces were rocked by retirements and departures. New Orleans lost nearly a quarter of its officers in the years after the pandemic—and then recorded its lowest homicide rate since the 1970s in 2025. Philadelphia had its lowest per-capita police staffing since 1985—and just clocked its lowest murder rate since 1966.
There are many plausible explanations for the recent crime downturn: sharper policing strategy, more police overtime, low unemployment, the lure of digital life, the post-pandemic return to normalcy. Each of these surely played a role. But only one theory can match the decline in its scope and scale: that the massive, post-pandemic investment in local governments deployed during the Biden administration, particularly through the American Rescue Plan Act, delivered a huge boost to the infrastructure and services of American communities—including those that suffered most from violent crime. That spending may be responsible for our current pax urbana.
Naturally, every local leader likes to say that their police department is making the difference. But in this case, every happy family is not alike: Police staffing and strategy vary widely from place to place, so an exceptional local police chief can hardly explain gains that are so widespread. “What has changed nationally is a huge investment by the federal government in prevention in response to the COVID epidemic,” John Roman, a criminal-justice researcher who heads NORC’s Center on Public Safety and Justice at the University of Chicago, told me. He credits ARPA with sending billions to local governments to use as they saw fit, and defines prevention in the broadest possible sense. “Investing in education, police, librarians, community centers, social workers, local nonprofits. Local-government employment rolls increased almost perfectly inverse to the crime rate.”…
These hypotheses are about to be put to a test. Police staffing is recovering in many cities, and police funding remains as much a political priority as ever, but the last of the ARPA grants will be spent this year, forcing cities to make choices about which programs to fund and which to eliminate. Many “alternative” public-safety grants have already been cut by the Trump administration, leaving recipients such as schools and community organizations in the lurch. It’s as if the national gravity pulling down crime rates will suddenly evaporate, Roman, at the University of Chicago, suggested, revealing the weight of local choices. Baltimore is working on a post-ARPA plan to make sure its public-health approach to policing can be supported by the city’s general fund, but not every investment of the Biden years can be sustained.
Whether the trend continues – violent crime decreases – or reverses – violence crime numbers go up, I imagine this will lead to a good amount of academic research. As noted above, there could be a lot of factors at play. What methods can help address the multiple forces at work? What data can get at all the factors at play?
Additionally, this is a political matter. At the local and national level, residents, the media, and politicians pay attention to these figures. Numerous actors would be interested in figuring out what exactly happened. Some will want to take credit, others will argue for changes.
And if it does turn out evidence shows large-scale public funding helped reduce violent crime, how much would that influence funding? This could be contingent on elections and who is in office but it could also depend on other budget priorities.
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