Tag Archives: ideology

Most people buy greener houses for the cost savings

Posted on by

At the end of a larger discussion about builders constructing more green houses, an industry insider talks about why people buy green homes:

Q: Over the years, industry studies have shown that consumers’ interest in green building has tended to focus on energy conservation; they want to reduce their heating, cooling and appliance costs.

Do they still see green building through that lens of energy efficiency? Are they more motivated to build green for the sake of being green?

A: They’re still energy-oriented. In the most recent study, about two-thirds of consumers who requested green features in their homes said they wanted either to lower energy use or to save money.

In addition, consumer health concerns related to indoor air quality have moved up rapidly among the reasons for requesting green. But concern for the environment was a major issue for only about one-fourth of consumers requesting green.

While it will be interesting to see what green features the new homes of the next few years have, I think this hints at a larger issue with green products: people are more willing to invest in them upfront (in the case of a house) or buy them if they offer savings in the long run. Even with houses, this insider suggests that 30% of people wouldn’t pay extra for green features. The motivation here is not necessarily the earth or all of humanity but rather costs for individuals. This is a very different ideology and seems rooted in a consumeristic mindset.

But what happens when going green requires higher prices – like gasoline or other energy prices – without obvious cost savings for individual consumers? This is a much harder sell.

We need a more complex analysis of how taxes affect income inequality

Posted on by

One current blogosphere discussion about whether taxes could help reduce income inequality would benefit from more complex analyses. Here is the discussion thus far according to TaxProf Blog:

There have been a number of reports published recently that purport to show a link between rising inequality and changes in tax policy — especially tax cuts for the so-called rich. The latest installment comes from Berkeley professor Emmanuel Saez, Striking it Richer: The Evolution of Top Incomes in the United States.

Saez and others who write on this issue seem so intent on proving a link between tax policy and inequality that they overlook the major demographic changes that are occurring in America that can contribute to — or at least give the appearance of — rising inequality; a few of these being, differences in education, the rise of dual-earner couples, the aging of our workforce, and increased entrepreneurship.

Today, we will look at the link between education and income. Recent census data comparing the educational attainment of householders and income shows about as clearly as you can that America’s income gap is really an education gap and not the result of tax cuts for the rich.

The chart below shows that as people’s income rise, so too does the likelihood that they have a college degree or higher. By contrast, those with the lowest incomes are most likely to have a high school education or less. Just 8% of those at the lowest income level have a college degree while 78% of those earning $250,000 or more have a college degree or advanced degree. At the other end of the income scale, 69% of low-income people have a high school degree or less, while just 9% of those earning over $250,000 have just a high school degree.

This analysis starts in the right direction: looking at a direct relationship between two variables such as tax rates and income inequality is difficult to do in isolation of other factors. While some factors may be more influential than others, there are a number of reasons for income inequality. In other words, graphs with two variables are not enough. Pulling out one independent variable at a time doesn’t give us the full picture.

But, then the supposedly better way is that we were just looking at the wrong variable’s influence on income and should have been looking at education instead! So after saying that the situation was more complex, we get another two variable graph that shows that as education goes up, so does income so perhaps it really isn’t about taxes at all.

What we need here is some more complex statistical analysis, preferably including regression analysis where we can see how a variety of factors at the same time influence income inequality. Some of this might be a little harder to model since you would want to account for changing tax rates but arguing over two variable graphs isn’t going to get us very far. Indeed, I wonder if this is more common now in debates: both sides like simpler analyses because it allows each to make the point they want without considering the full complexity of the matter. In other words, easier to make graphs line up more with ideological commitments rather than an interest in truly sorting out what factors are more influential in affecting income inequality.

Quick Review: The Better Angels of Our Nature

Posted on by

I hadn’t looked at much from psychologist Stephen Pinker for a while but I was intrigued by his latest book The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. Here are a few comments about this thought-provoking work:

1. Here is Pinker’s argument: we must just be living in the safest era in human history as violent crime is down and wars affect fewer people. If you adjust for the population on earth at the time, World War II barely makes the top 10 (while typically lists put it at #1). Since World War II, fewer people are affected by violence and most people don’t know this.

2. Best argument of this book: this remarkable peacefulness is almost completely under-the-radar and people need to recognize how much safer the world has become. (I’ve noted before the incorrect perceptions regarding crime.)

2a. Pinker marshals a lot of evidence to show the declining trends in violence. In fact, Pinker talks about this for dozens upon dozens of pages. In fact, if you went by the percentage of the book devoted to each topic, you might think Pinker is more of a social scientist who studies violence and who is most interested in how societies and cultures have changed in such a way as to deincentivize violence. Overall, the number of wars have decreased, the number of wars involving great powers has decreased, the number of soldier and civilian deaths has decreased, and the length of wars have decreased. Pinker is, of course, building upon the work of many others but there are a lot of charts and figures here that I find quite convincing.

2b. Several periods were key to this change: the Enlightenment which didn’t necessarily limit violence but brought about ideas and values that eventually contributed and the post-World War II era when the world responded to the horror by promoting international peace and human rights.

3. The catch: Pinker is committed to going beyond a social explanation in the decrease in violence and wants to argue that this has trickled down to individuals. On one hand, you could imagine a number of sociologists making this argument: changes in society and culture influence the choices available to and made by individuals. On the other hand, Pinker wants to go further and even suggest that humans have evolved away from violence. Making this connection between social and individual change is tougher to do and Pinker relies a lot on social psychology experiments such as Prisoner’s Dilemma and the Ultimatum Game. The social and cultural change arguments are convincing but taking this next step to the individual level is more problematic. Part of the problem here might be that Pinker is so committed to his own perspective that he is determined to push his points about rationality further than they can go.

4. An interesting issue: Pinker argues that one way in which violence can get out of hand is that it requires a powerful ideology. One type of ideology that Pinker makes clear he does not like is religion which he argues is false and generally contributes to violence. In his historical overviews, Pinker makes clear that religion only contributes to and legitimizes violence and may not do any good. Additionally, the revolutions in values happened solely in the secular sphere and humans today are much more able to be rational (and religion is not that).

Overall, this is an interesting, long book that presents several intriguing arguments. Pinker provides a service in helping to fight the narrative that violence is spiraling out of control and yet has more difficulty in showing how humans have evolved into more rational beings.

The “theology” of “inevitable suburban decline”

Posted on by

Joel Kotkin keeps firing at suburban critics:

Perhaps no theology more grips the nation’s mainstream media — and the planning community — more than the notion of inevitable suburban decline. The Obama administration’s housing secretary, Shaun Donavan, recently claimed, “We’ve reached the limits of suburban development: People are beginning to vote with their feet and come back to the central cities.”…

In the past decade, suburbia extended its reach, even around the greatest, densest and most celebrated cities. New York grew faster than most older cities, with 29% of its growth taking place in five boroughs, but that’s still a lot lower than the 46% of growth they accounted for in the 1990s. In Chicago, the suburban trend was even greater. The outer suburbs and exurbs gained over a half million people while the inner suburbs stagnated and the urban core, the Windy City, lost some 200, 000 people.

Rather than flee to density, the Census showed a population shift from more dense to less dense places. The top ten population gainers among metropolitan areas — growing by 20%, twice the national average, or more — are the low-density Las Vegas, Raleigh, Austin, Charlotte, Riverside–San Bernardino, Orlando, Phoenix, Houston, San Antonio and Atlanta. By contrast, many of the densest metropolitan areas — including San Francisco, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Boston and New York — grew at rates half the national average or less…

What about the other big demographic, the millennials? Like previous generations of urbanists, the current crop mistake a totally understandable interest in cities among post-adolescents. Yet when the research firm Frank Magid asked millennials what made up their “ideal” locale, a strong plurality opted for suburbs — far more than was the case in earlier generations.

Is this simply a battle of interpreting statistics? For example, Kotkin says Millennials aren’t completely enamored with the suburbs while others have used these statistics to mean other things. Kotkin says that Americans continue to vote for the suburbs with their actions. When given a choice, Kotkin seems to be suggesting that a majority of Americans, young and old, would choose the suburbs if all things were equal. In contrast, Kotkin suggests that urbanists want people to want the city. This ideology (“theology” in his terms) guides their interpretation of the data and leads to wishful thinking.

This is a bigger debate that isn’t addressed directly here: are the cities or suburbs better for people, society, and the world? Kotkin’s writings lean toward giving people freedom which is found more in the suburbs. Urbanists make arguments the other way: cities are greener, more diverse, and more cultured. Would or could Kotkin make his arguments if most Americans lived in cities rather than suburbs? This is really a discussion about values: should people live in the cities and suburbs and isn’t just about current or future realities.

h/t Instapundit

Describing “suburban bliss” while also pursuing urban planning and living

Posted on by

A student at Columbia discusses her feelings of wanting to become an urban planner and live in the city while also retaining a warm spot in her heart for the suburbs:

Coming to New York from more suburban hometowns, it’s not uncommon for us to miss our cars, big box stores, and front yards. But for me, the conflict between urban and suburban living is more than simple nostalgia for my hometown. It is a question of ideology, and one that concerns my professional future.

I’ve known I wanted to be a city planner since the tenth grade, when I happened to pick up a copy of Jane Jacobs’ “The Death and Life of Great American Cities” while doing homework at the Scotch Plains Public Library. I devoured the book in a few days. It was a revelation for me—someone put into words the vitality of urban streets I so eagerly took in anytime I visited New York. As an urban studies major at Columbia, I’ve studied cities in sociology, political science, history, and architecture classes. My studies have confirmed what I felt the first time I read Jane Jacobs: Urban living is the best kind of living.

I’ve read about the racial discrimination that stopped non-white Americans from taking part in the suburban American dream, the urban renewal projects that devastated working class neighborhoods with expressways, the disinvestment in urban centers that led to riots—all the mid-century injustices that remind us of the true cost of our driveways, lawns, and cul-de-sacs. I understand the environmental danger of car (and oil) dependence, low-density housing, and sprawl. I understand how unfulfilling it can be to live in a socially homogeneous town with little street life or walkability. I feel so strongly about these issues that I even want to go to graduate school to learn how to begin solving them.

Yet I really, really like coming home to my car and to my favorite strip mall restaurant on Route 22—a highway that severely isolates my own neighborhood from the rest of my town. In my time here at Columbia, despite my urban-centric curriculum, I’ve also learned that the suburbs are here to stay, and there’s no sense wishing they didn’t exist. I might end up a city planner with a very urban lifestyle, and I most certainly won’t be moving back to New Jersey, but there’s no reason I can’t relish a trip to the mall. Of course it’s not terrible, I told my friend. Home—with all its unsexy suburbanity—always makes me happy, too.

This piece contrasts a professional ideology versus personal emotions. The key here is that the suburbs are equated with home. I wonder if her viewpoint will change after years of living in the city or, perhaps more interestingly, years of working within the field of urban planning where she may not find too many people willing to defend the suburbs.

Of course, this doesn’t always have to be a dichotomous choice: we certainly need people to do urban planning in the suburbs. In fact, one of the complaints opponents of sprawl often have is that it looks like there was little foresight into how suburban developments, subdivisions or big box stores included, affect their residents and how different types of development do or don’t work together. And if the wave of the future is indeed a denser suburban landscape, particularly in desirable locations, there may be room for a number of planners to bring together city and suburb.

Same data, different conclusions about poverty in “Rick Perry’s Texas”

Posted on by

With the increased national exposure of Texas Governor Rick Perry comes more people picking apart his political career. While Perry has been quick to tout Texas’ economic progress during his tenure, the same data regarding the state’s poverty rate can be used to reach different conclusions.

A CNN article titled “Poverty grows in Rick Perry’s Texas” has this to say:

While it’s true that Texas is responsible for 40% of the jobs added in the U.S. over the past two years, its poverty rate also grew faster than the national average in 2010.

Texas ranks 6th in terms of people living in poverty. Some 18.4% of Texans were impoverished in 2010, up from 17.3% a year earlier, according to Census Bureau data released this week. The national average is 15.1%.

And being poor in Texas isn’t easy. The state has one of the lowest rates of spending on its citizens per capita and the highest share of those lacking health insurance. It doesn’t provide a lot of support services to those in need: Relatively few collect food stamps and qualifying for cash assistance is particularly tough.

“There are two tiers in Texas,” said Miguel Ferguson, associate professor of social work at University of Texas at Austin. “There are parts of Texas that are doing well. And there is a tremendous number of Texans, more than Perry has ever wanted to acknowledge, that are doing very, very poorly.”

This is the more negative interpretation of this data that highlights a growing underclass in Texas. Perry may talk about job growth but there is a growing segment of the population that isn’t participating in this growth.

On the other side of the spectrum, a “Democrat and urbanist” (Instapundit’s description) suggests “The Texas Story Is Real“:

Lastly, the poverty rate is higher in Texas than in the US as a whole – 17.2% vs. 14.3%, not a small difference. However, the gap actually narrowed between the two during the 2000s, as the chart below in the percentage point change in the poverty rate illustrates.

[The graph shows the “Change in % of Population For Whom Poverty Status Is Determined (2000-2009).” Texas is at roughly 1.8%, the United States as a whole at roughly 1.95%.]

While every statistic isn’t a winner for Texas, most of them are, notably on the jobs front. And if nothing else, it does not appear that Texas purchased job growth at the expense of job quality, at least not at the aggregate level.  There are certainly deeper places one might drill into and find areas of concern or underperformance, but that’s true of everywhere.  And these top line statistics are commonly used to compare cities and states. Unless Texas critics are ready to retire these measures from their own arsenal, it seems clear that Texas is a winner.  The Texas story is real.

While acknowledging that Texas has a higher poverty rate (and this doesn’t include 2010 data), this commentator suggests that Texas had a smaller increase in this population compared to the United States.

This is a classic example of how two sides that are looking at the same data can come to two very different conclusions. For one, the poverty data indicates that Rick Perry is allowing some of Texas’ population to fall behind while the other suggests the poverty data isn’t so bad since the poverty rate grew less than that of the United States as a whole. In this case, I suspect the data itself won’t win over either side since ideology trumps the data.

More broadly, will most Americans consider these fine-tuned arguments when considering Rick Perry as a candidate? Probably not. Quoting a sociologist in a post yesterday, “Questioning someone’s religious sincerity is totally a factor of whether you already like that person.” This may also apply to their supposed economic impact.

The difference between a sociologist and a geologist, the “soft” and “hard” sciences

Posted on by

Comments about sociology can come from anywhere. See this example from a House member discussing FDA guidelines:

The most intense reaction was generated by a provision offered by Rep. Denny Rehberg (R-Mont.) that would block the FDA from issuing rules or guidance unless its decisions are based on “hard science” rather than “cost and consumer behavior.” The amendment would prevent the FDA from restricting a substance unless it caused greater harm to health than a product not containing the substance.

“The FDA is starting to use soft sciences in some considerations in the promulgation of its rules,” said Rehberg, who defined “hard science”, as “perceived as being more scientific, rigorous and accurate” than behavioral and social sciences.

“I hate to try and define the difference between a psychiatrist and a psychologist, between a sociologist and a geologist, but there is clearly a difference,” he told the committee.

Three sets of comparisons are made here: between psychology and psychiatry, sociology and geology, and “hard” and “soft” science. I think it is pretty easy to make the first two distinctions, particularly between geology and sociology. But the third comparison seems a little strange: does Rehberg want to suggest that soft sciences are less true or that they matter less/are less valid for FDA decision making?

Overall, it sounds like Rehberg is suggesting that the “soft” sciences (psychology and sociology) are not as important in crafting FDA policies as the actual science that says whether certain products are good or bad for humans. But it seems somewhat silly to suggest that perceptions and behaviors shouldn’t influence policy decisions. A lot of legislation is driven by perceptions and values in addition to the actual influences in the physical world. Think about some of the major issues being discussed today such as the deficit or taxes: less of the conversation is about the actual impact on the country and more involves ideologies about who should be responsible for funding the government and what is the proper role and/or size of the government. One of the problems presented in this article is instructive: cigarettes are not illegal and yet government bodies are interested in limiting the consumption of them. Therefore, while menthol cigarettes may not be that much more harmful, if it is attractive to younger kids who then take smoking, why not regulate this? Of course, the smoking example is a loaded one and it would be hard to find someone who would suggest more smoking among teenagers is a good thing.

Based on this discussion, would either political party be willing to create legislation only based on “hard science” or is this only a suggestion when the “hard science” supports one’s existing viewpoint? Additionally, are there politicians out there who have publicly supported sociology rather than suggested it is a “soft” science?

“Sustainability thinker” suggests sprawling suburbs can’t really be green

Posted on by

A common target of those concerned with being green and sustainability are American suburbs. While some might suggest that suburbs can become more green (read here and  here), Alex Steffen, a sustainability thinker, suggests it really isn’t possible:

What’s a sustainability trend that you wish would go away?

Shallow redesigns of suburban life. You see a lot of proposals these days that seem to suggest that all that open space is perfect for farming, or that we can power our McMansions and cars with solar panels, so even the suburbs can “go green.” The brutal reality is that newer, more sprawling suburbs—and especially the cheap boom-years exburbs—aren’t just a bit unsustainable, they’re ruinously unsustainable in almost every way, and nothing we know of will likely stop their decline, much less fix them easily.

Unfortunately, it isn’t really clear what Steffen means by this. What constitutes a “shallow redesign” versus something more substantive? Would Steffen agree with New Urbanists that suburbs can be redesigned in ways to promote green behavior? This statement is also interesting: “nothing we know of will likely stop their decline.” They may be in decline now due to financial concerns (the budgets of local communities, the ability of homeowners to purchase large new homes) but does that mean that they will be on the decline forever? Could we have the same type of sprawl with just more green single-family homes (like LEED Platinum homes)? What sort of suburbs, if any, would he be in favor of?

As I read Steffen’s comments, I thought about the trade-offs those interested in being green and sustainability might have to make regarding American suburbs. Given the popularity of suburbs in American life, both as an ideology and an actual destination of a majority of Americans, can this movement really claim that suburbs as a whole are bad? Instead, most arguments seem to be incremental: suburbs can be modified in ways, such as having LEED homes or more mass-transit or more fuel efficient cars, that retain some of their key attributes without turning it into city life. But even with these sorts of incremental arguments, I wonder how many of the commentators really wish that suburbs would just disappear but can’t admit such things because the American public would react negatively.

Michael Gerson: Obama’s faith-based campaigning has lost steam

Posted on by

Michael Gerson, President Bush’s head speechwriter for most of his time in office, argues that while President Obama successfully courted religious voters during his campaign, those same voters have now turned against him. Here are Gerson’s reasons for why this has happened:

There are a number of reasons for the believers’ remorse. Social issues blurred during a campaign naturally become more vivid and divisive in the process of governing. Obama’s campaign appeal to reconciliation — which impressed many religious voters — has dissolved into prickly partisanship.

But the failure of Obama’s religious appeal is also ideological. It is true that evangelicals are generally not libertarian. They admit a place for government in encouraging values and caring for the needy. Yet they do not believe that governmental elites share their values or have their best interests at heart. Among conservative Christians, government is often viewed as a force of secularization — a source of both bureaucratic regulation and moral deregulation. By identifying with expanded government, Obama fed long-standing evangelical fears of the aggressive, secular state.

It sounds then like the issue may be that while voters liked what they were hearing, they don’t particularly like the way this was to be carried out through an increased role for government. Putting these values from the campaign into practice has proven to be a difficult task.

But it is interesting to note that Gerson concludes that religious voters, a good number of whom are conservative, cannot break from their views on the size of government to support Obama’s faith plans. Gerson suggests that many of these voters have been pushed by Obama into an ideological choice: big government or faith concerns. Why do these two concerns have to be so linked? This is a bigger issue that Gerson touches on by suggesting that “There are a range of options between government as the first resort and government as the enemy — options that few in our political debate seem willing to offer.”

Politics in sociology

Posted on by

A behavioral sciences graduate from Israel describes his experiences in a sociology department and compares sociologists to journalists at YNetNews:

Anyone who ever read a sociological essay immediately realized that to a large extent a sociologist is just like a newspaper columnist.

The sociologist’s columns tend to be longer and more deeply reasoned, yet at their base there will always be an expression of a wholly political view.

While this former student describes a department where only one ideology was allowed, he raises an interesting issue in sociological work. On one hand, research is supposed to be science: rational, logical arguments and theories built upon accurate measurements of what is actually happening in the world. On the other hand, researchers do have opinions and political stances and they tend to do work in areas of their own interest.This was first made clear to me in graduate school when professors quickly switched between their activist and political interests and the research pieces they were working on.

My research methods class starts with a discussion of Max Weber’s essay about “value-free” sociology. Weber suggests sociologists should not make value judgments. Students tend to argue that we all have a bias and this is very difficult to remove from our social science work.

The comparison to journalists is also interesting. In my introduction to sociology class, I suggest sociologists are different than journalists in that sociologists draw upon more comprehensive data and are not just writing opinions or drawing conclusions based on a few interviews. Additionally, journalists often describe trends or events while sociologists are interested in explanations and the mechanisms that lead from Point A to Point B.

It sounds like this former student’s call for ideological pluralism in sociology comes from some personal experiences where his opinions did not line up with those of his professors. Yet his essay is a reminder of the (sometimes thin) line between research and politics.