Looking at the predictive abilities of macroeconomics, Paul Krugman suggests there is an issue with the “sociology of economics”:
So, let’s grant that economics as practiced doesn’t look like a science. But that’s not because the subject is inherently unsuited to the scientific method. Sure, it’s highly imperfect — it’s a complex area, and our understanding is in its early stages. And sure, the economy itself changes over time, so that what was true 75 years ago may not be true today — although what really impresses you if you study macro, in particular, is the continuity, so that Bagehot and Wicksell and Irving Fisher and, of course, Keynes remain quite relevant today.
No, the problem lies not in the inherent unsuitability of economics for scientific thinking as in the sociology of the economics profession — a profession that somehow, at least in macro, has ceased rewarding research that produces successful predictions and rewards research that fits preconceptions and uses hard math instead.
Why has the sociology of economics gone so wrong? I’m not completely sure — and I’ll reserve my random thoughts for another occasion.
This is an occasional discussion in social sciences like economics or sociology: how much are they really like a science in the sense of making testable predictions (not about the natural world but for social behavior) versus whether they are more interpretive. I’m not surprised Krugman takes this stance but it is interesting that he says the issue is within the discipline itself for rewarding the wrong things. If this is the case, what could be done to reward successful predictions? At this point, Krugman is suggesting a problem without offering much of a solution. As a number of people, like Nassim Taleb and Nate Silver, have noted in recent years, making predictions is quite difficult, requires a more humble approach, and requires particular methodological and statistical approaches.