It’s not just bad that murders are up in Chicago; it is also that murders are still falling in other major cities

While murders in Chicago are up in 2012, murders continue to fall in other big cities:

Jack Levin, a sociology and criminology professor at Boston’s Northeastern University, says it’s troubling that Chicago’s murder count is rising while it falls in other major cities. In 2010, Los Angeles had 297 murders, the lowest since 1967. New York homicides have been declining since 1990, when a record 2,245 fell in the nation’s largest city.

The rest of the article then discusses what might be done in Chicago.

However, why not put this in a more comparative perspective? In other words, just how unique is Chicago compared to other places? As an urban sociologist, this is an interesting if more broad question: are the major US cities more similar or more different? Putting it differently, what is so unique about Chicago that leads to the occurrence of more murders? Chicagoans themselves, and probably also residents of other major cities, may think their city is ultimately unique and not replicable elsewhere. Yes, major cities differ on a variety of factors but they also share some common characteristics such as social complexity, pockets of wealth and poverty, the strong presence of gangs, large (and occasionally problematic) police forces, and politicians who want to reduce the crime rate to make the city safer, protect kids, burnish the city’s image, and help promote economic growth. Is there anything Chicago could learn from elsewhere in order to reduce the murder rate?

 

Sociologist: 70% of murders in two high-crime Chicago neighborhoods tied to social network of 1,600 people

Social networks can be part of more nefarious activities: sociologist Andrew Papachristos looked at two high-crime Chicago neighborhoods and found that a majority of the murders involved a small percentage of the population.

Papachristos looked at murders that occurred between 2005 and 2010 in West Garfield Park and North Lawndale, two low-income West Side neighborhoods. Over that period, Papachristos found that 191 people in those neighborhoods were killed.

Murder occasionally is random, but, more often, he found, the victims have links either to their killers or to others linked to the killers. Seventy percent of the killings he studied occurred within what Papachristos determined was a social network of only about 1,600 people — out of a population in those neighborhoods of about 80,000.

Each person in that network of 1,600 people had been arrested at some point with at least one other person in the same network.

For those inside the network, the risk of being murdered, Papachristos found, was about 30 out of 1,000. In contrast, the risk of getting killed for others in those neighborhoods was less than one in 1,000.

On one hand, this isn’t too surprising, especially considering the prevalence of gangs. At the same time, these numbers of striking: if a resident is in this small network, their risk of being murdered jumps 3000%.

I would be interested to know how closely the Chicago Police have mapped social networks like these. Do they use special social network software that helps them visualize the network and see nodes? Indeed, the article suggests the police are doing something like this:

Now, he wants to tap the same social networking analysis techniques that Papachristos, the Yale sociologist, developed to identify potential shooting victims, only McCarthy wants to use it to identify potential killers.

Police brass will cross-reference murder victims and killers with their known associates — the people projected as most likely to be involved in future shootings.

“Hot people,” McCarthy calls them.

Those deemed most likely to commit violence will be targeted first: parolees and people who have outstanding arrest warrants.

McCarthy said his staff estimates there are 26,000 “hot people” living in Chicago.

It would also be worthwhile to see how effective such strategies are. This isn’t the first time that organizations/agencies have tried to identify at-risk individuals. So how effective is it in the long run?

Hundreds of thousands of pieces of military gear passed into the hands of local police departments

Wired has an interesting story about the amount of military gear that is now in the hands of local police departments:

Small police departments across America are collecting battlefield-grade arsenals thanks to a program that allows them to get their hands on military surplus equipment – amphibious tanks, night-vision goggles, and even barber chairs or underwear – at virtually no cost, except for shipment and maintenance…

In 2011 alone, more than 700,000 items were transferred to police departments for a total value of $500 million. This year, as of May 15, police departments already acquired almost $400 million worth of stuff. Last year’s record would have certainly been shattered if the Arizona Republic hadn’t revealed in early May that a local police department used the program to stockpile equipment – and then sold the gear to others, something that is strictly forbidden. Three weeks after the revelation, the Pentagon decided to partly suspend distribution of surplus material until all agencies could put together an up-to-date inventory of all the stuff they got through the years. A second effort, which gives federal grants to police departments to purchase equipment, is still ongoing, however. According to the Center for Investigative Reporting, since 9/11, the grants have totaled $34 billion…

Officials in these Police Departments still maintain that these costs and this apparently unnecessary equipment are worth it. “If you can save one life,” said Lieutenant Tim Clouse of the Tupelo Police Department referring to a missing person they were able to spot thanks to the chopper, “it was very much worth it.” Pierce, from Cobb County, echoes the thought. “If it saves one life then it’s worth the money and the effort put into it.”…

According to Stamper, having small local police departments go around with tanks and military gear has “a chilling effect on any effort to strengthen the relationship” between the community and the cops. And that’s not the only danger. “There’s no justification for them having that kind of equipment, for one obvious reason, and that is if they have it, they will find a way to use it. And if they use it they will misuse it altogether too many times,” said Stamper. What happened a year ago in Arizona, when army veteran Jose Guerena was shot down during a drug raid that found no drugs in his house, could very well be an example of that misuse.

It would be intriguing to see how local residents would respond to seeing such gear being used in their community, perhaps nearby or even on their street. Imagine you are minding your own business in the front yard and all of the sudden one of Nebraska’s “three amphibious eight-wheeled tanks” comes your way. Kind of shatters the image of suburban or more rural pastoralism. Actually, this could make for a Hollywood action film: local ne’er-do-well breaks into the local police department, takes the keys for the local tank from the snoozing cop, and goes on a rampage.

If some local departments have all of this gear, do they use it regularly in the public eye? If not, why not? Will some of it be on display at local July 4th parades?

Predicting and preventing burglaries though statistical models in Indio, California

In January 2011, I wrote about how Santa Clara, California was going to use statistical models to predict where crime would take place and then deploy police accordingly. Another California community, Indio, is going down a similar route to reduce burglaries:

The Indio Police Department with the help of a college professor and a wealth of data and analysis is working on just that — predicting where certain burglaries will occur.The goal is to stop them from happening through effective deployment or preventative measures…

The police department began the Smart Policing Initiative a year ago with $220,617 in federal funding from the U.S. Department of Justice…

Robert Nash Parker, a professor of sociology at the University of California, Riverside and an expert on crime, is working with Indio.

On Friday, he shared his methodology for tracking truancy and burglary rates.

He used data from the police department, school district, U.S Census Bureau and probation departments, to create a model that can be used to predict such daytime burglaries.

Nash said that based on the data, truancy seems to lead to burglary hot spots.

A few issues come to mind:

1. Could criminals simply change up their patterns once they know about this program?

2. Do approaches like this simply treat the symptoms rather than the larger issues, in this case, truancy? It is a good thing to prevent crimes or arrest people quickly but what about working to limit the potential for crime in the first place?

3. I wonder how much data is required for this to work and how responsive it is to changes in the data.

4. Since this is being funded by a federal agency, can we expect larger roll-outs in the future? Think of this approach versus that of a big city like Chicago where there has been a greater emphasis on the use of cameras.

Explaining the continued drop in crime in 2010

The FBI recently released preliminary crime statistics for 2010 and crime was down again. While this is  good news for many places, scholars are left wondering what explains the drop:

Crime levels fell across the board last year, extending a multi-year downward trend with a 5.5 percent drop in the number of violent crimes in 2010 and a 2.8 percent decline in the number of property crimes…

“In a word, remarkable,” said James Alan Fox, a criminologist at Northeastern University. In Fox’s view, the declines signify success for aggressive law enforcement and corrections programs and comprehensive crime prevention efforts. He said the crime levels could easily rise if the current environment of state and local budget cutting extends to law enforcement measures that are working.

Some experts are puzzled.

Expectations that crime would rise in the economic recession have not materialized. The size of the most crime-prone population age groups, from late teens through mid-20s, has remained relatively flat in recent years.

Whoever could provide a comprehensive answer to this this puzzle could attract a lot of attention. In my Introduction to Sociology class, I have my students read some about the prominence of the “broken windows theory” in the 1990s and the various commentators who think it does or doesn’t work. The people involved in putting that theory into practice in the 1990s, like William Bratton and Rudy Giuliani, rode that wave for quite a while. It is interesting to read Fox’s answer above: he seems to attribute the drop to “law enforcement measures.” Even here, there are multiple strategies in play. While communities might want a single factor or strategy that they could hone in on, crime, like many other social issues, is a complex matter with a lot of involved actors.

h/t Instapundit

From gated communities to cameras and license plate readers

In the 1990s and early 2000s, there was an increase in scholarly work addressing the growing phenomenon of gated communities. Such communities were often criticized for at least giving the appearance of trying to withdraw from the world, being exclusive, and indulging the fears of suburbanites. So I wonder what these researchers might think about a community that wants to use cameras to read the license plates of everyone who enters their community:

Kings Point is one of the wealthiest villages on the North Shore, and residents want to keep it that way with the latest security…

To protect its 3.3 square miles, Kings Point plans to install 44 cameras and license plate readers at each of the 19 points of entry. The devices will take pictures of every vehicle and license plate and compare them to data bases.

“It will alert us to suspended registrations, felonies, stolen cars, order of protection, sex offenders, things like that,” Kings Point Police Commissioner Jack Miller said…

There’s no way of knowing whether the project will reduce crime. It may just send it off to other towns that are less secure.

Police said the project will cost $1 million, and will be paid for over several years. They also stressed only police will have access to surveillance information.

The article mentions one other key piece of information: there seems to have been a (small?) string of recent crimes in the community which has prompted the installation of cameras.

There may be some privacy issues here but I think some of same concerns about gated communities could be raised about this move. This is a wealthy community: according to Census data, there are 5,305 residents, the median household income (in 2009 dollars) is $144,000, the median home value is $1,000,000+, 55.3% of those 25 and older have a bachelor’s degree or more, and the community is 95.3% white, 3.4% Asian, and 3.1% Latino. Is this simply a move to protect the exclusivity of this community? While the article references plans in New York and London (presumably to fight terrorism), does a community like this really need to go to this level? If you look at some neighborhood/real estate websites, Kings Point Village seems to have quite a low crime rate (with a fun feature of this link being you get to see your odds of “becoming a victim” in whatever community you search for). This seems to me to be a much better question than whether police should have access to this information and therefore invade your privacy.

Additionally, it will be interesting to see what police do with this data. Which criminal offenses are enough to warrant attention? Is the goal of the program just to have a record of who was in the community so that they can be tracked down later or will there be more immediate actions taken? If the goal is to just to track down people after a crime has been committed, will residents be happy or will they suggest that the crime should have been prevented?

How to discover hidden racial profiling in McHenry County police data

McHenry County is located northwest of Chicago, has just over 300,000 residents, and is part of the six-county Chicago region. In recent years, the county has had a growing Hispanic population (2009 Census figures estimate Hispanics make up about 11% of the population) and there was data to suggest that Hispanics might have been racially profiled by local police. Here is how the Chicago Tribune describes the data between 2004 and 2009:

Racial profiling is difficult to prove. That’s why researchers push for data collection, to flag potential problems. In 2004, the first year data were collected, McHenry County’s indicators were high.

Statewide, minorities were 15 percent more likely to be stopped than what would have been expected based on their respective populations.

McHenry County’s disparity rate, however, was 65 percent, more than double that of the Chicago area’s five other sheriff’s departments.

The county’s rate, however, began dropping dramatically in 2007, and by 2009 was average for area sheriff’s departments.

On the surface, this data suggests the problem might have been solved: police were made aware of the issue and McHenry County’s numbers were back in line with regional figures within a few years.

But the Chicago Tribune goes on to say that a statistical analysis suggests it isn’t that racial profiling actually decreased; rather, McHenry County police simply marked Hispanics as white in their reports:

By 2009, the statistical analysis showed, 1 in 3 Hispanics cited by deputies likely were mislabeled as white or not included in department data reported to the state.

•If mislabeling and underreporting are taken into account, the department’s official rate of minority stops would have towered over its Chicago-area peers rather than appearing average.

•Department brass repeatedly missed warning signs of potential problems, even after a deputy complained that some peers targeted Hispanics.

So how exactly did the Chicago Tribune do this analysis: how does one look between the lines of arrest data to make a claim about current racial profiling? As a sidebar in the print edition and an extra link to click on online, the Tribune describes how they did their analysis:

Drivers’ names from the court and department data were compared with names in the census database to find each driver’s likelihood of Hispanic ethnicity. Mirroring methodology of similar research, drivers were deemed Hispanic only if their last names were 70 percent or more likely to be Hispanic.

The department data were used to analyze accuracy of labeling by deputies — comparing the rate of likely Hispanics with what each deputy logged. But the department database lacked records of all cited drivers, so the Tribune used the court data to determine the extent of mislabeling and incorrect logging departmentwide. The rate of likely Hispanics, as shown by the court data, was compared with the rate of Hispanics that the department told the state it cited.

In doing the departmentwide analysis, the Tribune counted only the labeling of likely Hispanics as white, because such mislabeling artificially improved the state’s rating of the department. Deputies at times also labeled likely Hispanics as other minorities, such as when a driver who looks like Sammy Sosa was labeled African-American. The analysis didn’t count that type of mislabeling because it didn’t affect the state’s rating.

Researchers say the census-based analysis is commonly used in studies but has limitations: It counts non-Hispanic women who marry Hispanics, and misses Hispanic women who marry non-Hispanics. It also misses Hispanics who have nontraditional surnames. With the limitations taken into account, it’s generally considered an undercount of Hispanics.

This is an interesting methodological process involving several moving parts. The analysis used and compared multiple sources of data. This triangulation method then doesn’t just rely the data that police report – such data can have issues as the TV show The Wire illustrated. Surnames from the records were compared to US Census records to determine the likelihood that the name is Hispanic. This isn’t going to catch all cases but the Tribune says other researchers claim this actually produces an undercount. If this is the case, perhaps McHenry County police are even further engaged in this practice. Also, what counts as a correct labeling or not is determined by the state.

A few lessons could be learned from this:

1. “Official data,” as self-reported police records here, are not necessarily trustworthy.

2. There are often multiple sources of data one can use to describe or evaluate a situation. Relying only on one source of data gives a part of the story – in this case, the one the police wanted to tell, which is interesting in itself – but having multiple sources can give a more complete picture.

3. If the Chicago Tribune analysis is correct, it is a reminder that “hiding” or “disguising” data can be difficult to do if people are interested or determined enough to look into what the data actually means.

“The Wire” creator defends depiction of Baltimore

In response to comments from the Baltimore Police Commissioner that the television show The Wire is going to harm  the city, creator David Simon defended the show:

Others might reasonably argue, however that it is not sixty hours of The Wire that will require decades for our city to overcome, as the commissioner claims. A more lingering problem might be two decades of bad performance by a police agency more obsessed with statistics than substance, with appeasing political leadership rather than seriously addressing the roots of city violence, with shifting blame rather than taking responsibility.  That is the police department we depicted in The Wire, give or take our depiction of some conscientious officers and supervisors. And that is an accurate depiction of the Baltimore department for much of the last twenty years, from the late 1980s, when cocaine hit and the drug corners blossomed, until recently, when Mr. O’Malley became governor and the pressure to clear those corners without regard to legality and to make crime disappear on paper finally gave way to some normalcy and, perhaps, some police work.  Commissioner Bealefeld, who was present for much of that history, knows it as well as anyone associated with The Wire.
We made things up, true.  We have never claimed otherwise.  But respectfully, with regard to our critique, we have slandered no one.  And to the extent you can stand behind a fictional tale, we stand by ours – and more importantly, our purpose in telling that tale.

It would be interesting to consider whether television shows and movies and other fictional works can have a significant impact on what people think about locations (and even further, whether it influences people’s decisions to move to certain places). The Wire was a critically acclaimed show but one with relatively low rating and even with more widespread DVD availability, it is still not a mainstream show.

There certainly is some link. Depictions of the inner city have impacted decades of suburban residents. I’m reminded of the Japanese businessmen who my father worked with when I was younger who knew two things about Chicago: it was the home of Michael Jordan and it was home to gangsters immortalized in film.

Now whether these depictions should reflect reality or some idealized or stereotyped view is another question. Simon defends The Wire on the grounds that the show was intended to showcase a different set of priorities:

But publicly, let me state that The Wire owes no apologies — at least not for its depiction of those portions of Baltimore where we set our story, for its address of economic and political priorities and urban poverty, for its discussion of the drug war and the damage done from that misguided prohibition, or for its attention to the cover-your-ass institutional dynamic that leads, say, big-city police commissioners to perceive a fictional narrative, rather than actual, complex urban problems as a cause for righteous concern. As citizens using a fictional narrative as a means of arguing different priorities or policies, those who created and worked on The Wire have dissented.

And this is a perspective or story that is rarely discussed in much depth.

I would be curious to hear how Simon would want people to view Baltimore after watching the show. Should they identify with the residents? Should they dislike the institutions? And ultimately, what should or could the viewers do to help change the situation?

Finding the right model to predict crime in Santa Cruz

Science fiction stories are usually the setting when people talk about predicting crimes. But it appears that the police department in Santa Cruz is working with an academic in order to forecast where crimes will take place:

Santa Cruz police could be the first department in Northern California that will deploy officers based on forecasting.

Santa Clara University assistant math professor Dr. George Mohler said the same algorithms used to predict aftershocks from earthquakes work to predict crime.”We started with theories from sociological and criminological fields of research that says offenders are more likely to return to a place where they’ve been successful in the past,” Mohler said.

To test his theory, Mohler plugged in several years worth of old burglary data from Los Angeles. When a burglary is reported, Mohler’s model tells police where and when a so-called “after crime” is likely to occur.

The Santa Cruz Police Department has turned over 10 years of crime data to Mohler to run in the model.

I wonder if we will be able to read about the outcome of this trial, regardless of whether the outcome is good or bad. If the outcome is bad, perhaps the police department or the academic would not want to publicize the results.

On one hand, this simply seems to be a problem of getting enough data to make accurate enough predictions. On the other hand, there will always be some error in the predictions. For example, how could a model predict something like what happened in Arizona this past weekend? Of course, one could include some random noise into the model – but these random guesses could easily be wrong.

And knowing the location of where crime would happen doesn’t necessarily mean that the crime could be prevented.

More financial problems in Chicago suburbs: underfunded police and fire pensions

If the federal government is short on money and so is the state of Illinois, then financial problems were eventually going to trickle down to individual communities, even those who would usually be considered wealthy. The Chicago Tribune details how many suburban municipalities have fallen behind in funding police and fire pensions:

Of the 300-plus pension funds across the region, only about 20 are rated by the state as fully funded…

The flaws and excesses were long masked by a strong economy, when big investment returns pushed average funding levels to nearly 80 percent a decade ago — which many experts consider to be healthy. The latest figures from 2009 show suburban public-safety pension funds, on average, have just 52 percent of the assets needed to be fully funded.

Though the true cost will vary from place to place, the unpaid tab averages nearly $2,700 for every suburban household. A strong economy could boost investment returns and lessen the liability, but experts say the financial sins of the past are too great for pension systems to merely invest their way out of them.

As lawmakers consider reforms, town leaders and unions point fingers. Unions complain towns haven’t saved enough and lawmakers failed to force them. Suburban leaders complain lawmakers required them to offer lucrative benefits without the cash to pay for them. The one thing they agree on: The recession made the problems far worse…

The state doesn’t compile figures of how many towns have done that, with such findings usually buried in individual fund audits. The Tribune reviewed every audit the state would provide — 153 of them in metro Chicago — and found regulators cited a third of their taxing districts for not providing enough cash to their pension funds.

A couple of things stand out to me about this story:

1. One issue appears to be that of fragmented suburban government. Illinois, specifically the Chicago region, is well-known for its many taxing districts and municipalities. If each community, big or small, was to provide a pension fund, there were bound to be problems when some of these communities cannot meet their obligations.

2. Residents are not going to be happy about this. There are a couple of places they might direct their anger: toward local officials who didn’t properly fund these pensions or toward police or fire unions (a common issue in more conservative locations). Residents are also likely to be unhappy if fire and police personnel, people who many citizens feel keep their communities livable and safe, are let go.

3. How would local communities explain their actions regarding funding pensions? Can they or local officials be held responsible, outside of voting against them?