Some thoughts on Progressive and Matt Fisher

By now, you’ve no doubt run across Matt Fisher’s blog post titled “My Sister Paid Progressive Insurance to Defend Her Killer In Court”. (If you haven’t yet seen Matt’s post, take a moment to read the original and his follow up). There have been lots of reactions to Matt’s story (to put it mildly), including over at Above the Law, where blogger “Juggalo Law” makes the following two observations:

1. Matt Fisher’s “grief is impossible for most, if not all, of us to imagine.”

Katie Fisher died in a car crash and her brother lashed out at the insurance company that made life for her surviving family more difficult. Matt Fisher’s overwrought tumblr post can be excused by the fact that, you know, his sister died in a car crash. His grief is impossible for most, if not all, of us to imagine. And yet thousands of people put on their imagineering hats and did just that.

As an initial matter, this seems like a denial of even the possibility of empathy. Is ATL really arguing that it is “impossible” for people generally to even imagine another person’s grief in the wake of death? Except for the very young, virtually everyone has known someone who has died, and we each face the inevitable prospect of our own mortality. Of course no one besides Matt Fisher knows the precise contours his grief, but this is hardly a persuasive, blanket argument that humanity generally is incapable of even imagining what his grief is like.

Furthermore, the tragedy at issue here is a death caused by an automobile accident. While the number of motor vehicle deaths in the U.S. varies from year to year, during the years 1981-2010 it ranged from 49,301 (1981) to 32,885 (2010). In all, 1,268,122 people died over this 30 year span. Even in a nation of over 300 million, this is an enormous number. Matt Fisher’s loss of his sister is tragic, but, sadly, it is not unique.

2. Insurance companies are “inhuman” entities whose “existence…is predicated on their attempts to make money. ”

Sometimes, life deals you a sh**ty hand. Death, however, always does. And yet, those stuck behind will undoubtedly encounter a world that barely shrugs in acknowledgement. And that’s how it should be. You will still be asked if you want a coffin with gold plating and you may be asked if you want your loved one’s ashes compressed into a beautiful diamond that you can wear around your neck for a lifetime. And all the mundane features of our economy will seemingly laugh at your grief. But they’re not laughing and insurance companies and all of the other businesses that survivors must joust with aren’t “inhuman monsters.” They’re merely inhuman. And they will follow protocol and attempt to minimize their own exposure as much as is possible. The existence of insurance companies is predicated on their attempts to make money. And nothing in this case suggests that their actions were borne out of anything other than this absolute truth.

Here, the ATL blogger seems to argue that insurance companies automatically get a pass for distasteful behavior because they are “inhuman” (with a strongly implied “what else do you expect?”). I think this approach lazily obscures rather than thoughtfully resolves any of the issues Matt Fisher’s personal tragedy raises. Obviously, the facts in this case are disputed and not fully known (at least publicly), and I have no personal knowledge of this matter. However, taking Matt’s original post and follow up clarification at face value, it is clear that Matt is not blaming Progressive for his sister’s death. Matt’s argument (and the general outrage) against Progressive boils down to these alleged facts:

  • Katie was a Progressive insurance customer with underinsured motorist coverage.
  • Katie was killed in an automobile accident with an underinsured motorist.
  • Asserting that Katie herself might have been responsible for the accident (in which case Progressive would have no legal obligation to pay under Maryland law), Progressive refused to pay what it owed under Katie’s policy to her surviving family members.
  • When Katie’s family went to court and sued the other driver to establish that he was liable for the accident rather than Katie, Progressive sent in its own lawyer(s) to help the other driver prove he was NOT liable.

So far as I can tell, the general outrage being directed at Progressive arises from this last assertion. I think most people understand that “fault” in auto accidents can be murky, and I think that many people would have understood if Progressive had refused to pay Katie’s policy until this issue was conclusively resolved by a court.

But that’s not why Matt’s post went viral. It went viral because he alleges, as he puts it in the title, “My Sister Paid Progressive Insurance to Defend Her Killer In Court.” The extreme outrage is not that an insurance company wanted to be 100% sure it owed money before paying out. The outrage is that (allegedly) an insurance company unleashed its lawyer(s) against its own customer. I agree with ATL that one generally expects auto insurance companies to “attempt[] to make money.” However, I submit that many do not expect auto insurance companies to proactively work against their own policyholders who are involved in accidents by making common cause with the other driver. It is one thing to dispute liability and force a court to sort the issue out. It is another thing to send lawyer(s) into the resulting lawsuit on behalf of the opposing side.

On the same day that Matt posted about Progressive, Bob Sutton blogged about how “United Airlines Lost My Friend’s 10 Year Old Daughter And Didn’t Care” (it’s as bad as you think, assuming the facts Bob recounts are all true). Bob narrates one part of the story in which the father is on the phone with a United employee located at the same airport as the lost 10-year-old, who was flying as an unaccompanied minor. When he “asked if the employee could go see if [his daughter] was OK,” she replied that she “was going off her shift and could not help. [He] then asked her if she was a mother herself and she said ‘yes’—he then asked her if she was missing her child for 45 minutes what would she do? She kindly told him she understood and would do her best to help.”

Bob writes:

This is the key moment in the story, note that in her role as a United employee, this woman would not help [the parents]. It was only when [the father] asked her if she was a mother and how she would feel that she was able to shed her deeply ingrained United indifference — the lack of felt accountability that pervades the system. Yes, there are design problems, there are operations problems, but the to me the core lesson is this is a system packed with people who don’t feel responsible for doing the right thing.

“Juggalo Law” titled its ATL post “Progressive Insurance Is Inhuman,” as if this fact excuses inhuman behavior. But just because corporations themselves aren’t people doesn’t mean their shareholders, managers, and employees aren’t. As Bob Sutton notes in his article on United Airlines, “a key difference between good and bad organizations is that, in the good ones, most everyone feels obligated and presses everyone else to do what is in their customer’s and organization’s best interests. I feel it as a customer at my local Trader Joe’s, on JetBlue and Virgin America, and In-N-Out Burger, to give a few diverse examples.”

Assuming the facts Matt alleges are true, Progressive clearly didn’t act in their customer Katie Fisher’s best interest. That’s not simply a sign that it wants to make money–or is legally organized as a corporation. If true, it’s a sign that it will act against its own customers whenever it can. Ironically, in a competitive marketplace, that approach is not in Progressive’s best interest. Indeed, the near-universal condemnation levelled at Progressive over the past few days suggests that such a narrowly self-interested approach is suicidal once it comes to light.

Credibility, statistics, and the legal profession

Elie Mystal at Above the Law has this take on a recent story involving credibility, statistics, and the legal profession:

This week, the law schools at Columbia, NYU, and Fordham have come under fire for their allegedly inflated employment statistics. A story in the New York Post specifically called out the top New York-area law schools for shady reporting of graduate outcomes when it comes to graduates employed by the schools….

I want to take a step back and look at what we’re really fighting about here: some of the best law schools in New York City have put out a statistic about how many graduates get jobs, and the New York Post and a bunch of other people immediately called “bulls**t.” Think about that. Even if the law schools can somehow convince people that, technically, their published information isn’t riddled with lies, we’re living in a world where such data can be assumed to be false absent a long and detailed explanation and discussion from the law schools. When somebody notices a discrepancy between a school’s numbers and what’s in the newspaper, we assume the school was full of crap, not that the newspaper got it wrong.

I suppose this isn’t very flattering to either newspapers or law schools.  Perhaps Americans now trust journalists more than lawyers (or at least legal educators)?

Commenting a few months ago on a scandal within academic sociology, Brian suggested several approaches to dealing with uncertain statistics:

This reminds me of Joel Best’s recommendations regarding dealing with statistics. One common option is to simply trust all statistics. Numbers look authoritative, often come from experts, and they can be overwhelming. Just accepting them can be easy. At the other pole is the common option of saying that all statistics are simply interpretation and are manipulated so we can’t trust any of them. No numbers are trustworthy. Neither approaches are good options but they are relatively easy options. The better route to go when dealing with scientific studies is to have the basic skills necessary to understand whether they are good studies or not and how the process of science works [emphasis added].

Brian’s point is a good one.  Unfortunately, it’s not possible to implement his “third way” here because the root problem is the lack of raw information rather than the inability to duplicate experimental/study results.  The question is not, in the theoretical abstract:  how many law students will get jobs when the economy is in condition X?  The question is rather:  as a matter of historical fact, how many 2010 law school graduates (or 2011, or 2009, or whatever) actually had jobs by date Y?

Elie faults the American Bar Association, which oversees and accredits law schools, for the current disaster of unreliable data:

The ABA is supposed to represent lawyers and law schools to the public. It’s supposed to relegate them so that the public can trust that moral and ethical standards are being upheld and enforced. And on that scale, the ABA has been an unmitigated failure. It’s done a disservice to all law schools. Nobody can trust any law school because the ABA has failed to impose effective oversight over all of them.

That’s tragic. A society is supposed to be proud of its institutions of higher learning, but the ABA has robbed us of that pride in our nation’s law schools. We no longer get to feel like our justice system is populated by people trained to the highest ethical standards, because we can’t even trust our law schools to tell us the truth about how many people got hired.

If the numbers published by law schools under the oversight of the ABA are unreliable, it goes without saying that it’s very difficult to derive these numbers through other means, especially in a form that allows for legitimate comparisons between schools and over time.  There are workarounds, of course, like journalistic attempts to compile and/or verify employment statistics independently of the law schools.  But those are obviously imperfect solutions, as The Economist recently noted in its analysis of the (surprisingly analogous) problem of Argentinan inflation statistics:

Since 2007 Argentina’s government has published inflation figures that almost nobody believes. These show prices as having risen by between 5% and 11% a year. Independent economists, provincial statistical offices and surveys of inflation expectations have all put the rate at more than double the official number (see article). The government has often granted unions pay rises of that order….

We [The Economist] hope that we can soon revert to an official consumer-price index for Argentina. That would require INDEC to be run by independent statisticians working unhindered. Until then, readers are better served by a credible unofficial figure than a bogus official one.

Unfortunately, for the foreseeable future, I think we’re going to need to start seeing a lot more credible unofficial figures out there, both for Argentinian inflation and for law school placement statistics.

The sun never sets on legal un(der)employment

John Flood, a U.K. legal scholar and sociologist, comments on the well-documented travails of recent U.S. law graduates, noting that their U.K. counterparts are facing similar difficulties as globalization changes the practice of law the world over:

What we’ve seen in the UK is a disjunct between the numbers of law students coming into the academy and the numbers of jobs available. For many the problem is that the academy is producing too many law graduates and should be more sensitive to job availibility rates….[T]here is also a big rise in the use of paralegals and I don’t mean those trained to be paralegals. Rather the unemployed would-be lawyers are turning to paralegaling in the hope that a training contract might open up while they are there.

What will entrench the stratification of the market is the opening up (de- and re-regulation) of the legal services market that’s now taking place. Fewer jobs will need to be done by fully-qualified lawyers. They can instead be carried out by a range of people qualified for certain legal and quasi-legal tasks. This is where corporatized law meets Tesco Law. [Tesco is a U.K.-based retailer similar to Wal-Mart.]

The US legal profession still thinks it can maintain a headlock on the control of the profession. How long for? At the expense of a cheap shot, [Egyptian President] Mubarek is finding a 30-year rule coming to end; [former British Prime Minister] Tony Blair only lasted for 10 years before he was ejected. Permanent monopoly becomes increasingly hard to justifiy, especially in a global market.

Flood also references a recent Above the Law article, which noted that Thomson Reuters recently

announced that it was exploring the sale of BAR/BRI, its bar exam prep business, and purchasing Pangea3, a legal process outsourcing company. That’s a strong message that they think there’s more of a future in hiring people to do low-end legal work, work that technically doesn’t constitute “practicing law” under legal ethics rules, than in training the practitioners of the future.

I’d like to see a quantitative analysis backing up some of Flood’s assertions, but his general points are well taken:

  • There are more lawyers than jobs.
  • Many law jobs do not, objectively speaking, require lawyers.
  • Much legal work can be done at a distance–even across international borders–as a back-office service.
  • In the long- (and maybe even the short-) run, the established legal cartels are no match for these forces of globalization.