How might a prediction of a crash in housing prices in specific cities affect behavior?

Goldman Sachs is predicting a big drop in housing values in four American cities:

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In a note to clients earlier this month, Goldman Sachs forecasted that four American cities in particular should gear up for a seismic decline compared to that of the 2008 housing crash.

San Jose, California; Austin, Texas; Phoenix, Arizona; and San Diego, California will likely see boom and bust declines of more than 25%.

Such declines would rival those seen around 15 years ago during the Great Recession. Home prices across the United States fell around 27%, according to the S&P CoreLogic Case-Shiller index…

In 2023, the investment bank expects home prices to barely fall in cities like New York (-0.3%) and Chicago (-1.8%) while predicting higher prices in Baltimore (+0.5%) and Miami (+0.8%).

It make sense that a company interested in investments and finance would want to make such a prediction. Will it change people’s behavior? A few ways this might matter:

-Local homeowners try to sell now before the big decline or prepare to stay put longer so they can see an increase in values. Either way, the supply of homes for sale is affected.

-Builders and developers reduce their construction and plans. They wait to see how long such a decline lasts. They hope to weather this and have higher profit margins later.

-Local governments steel for the impacts to tax revenues and population growth.

-People who might consider moving to or investing in the area reconsider. Would lower housing values make the area more attractive? (This might conflict with fewer homes for sale.)

Does such a prediction become a self-fulfilling prophecy to some degree as people wait for the drop in home prices?

Trader turned sociologist writes book about Goldman Sachs

A new book on Goldman Sachs is written from an interesting perspective: a trader for the firm turned sociology PhD student.

After writing a paper about organizational change, a professor encouraged him to write about Wall Street.

“He said, ‘No one in sociology understands banks, so you can make a contribution in that area,’ ” Mr. Mandis said…

The essence of his argument is that Goldman came under a variety of pressures that resulted in slow, incremental changes to the firm’s culture and business practices, resulting in the place being much different from what it was in 1979, when the bank’s former co-head, John Whitehead, wrote its much-vaunted business principles.

These changes included the shift to a public company structure, a move that limited Goldman executives’ personal exposure to risk and shifted it to shareholders. The I.P.O. also put pressure on the bank to grow, causing trading to become a more dominant focus. And Goldman’s rapid growth led to more potential for conflicts of interest and not putting clients’ interests first, Mr. Mandis says.

More sociological analysis of the financial industry, particularly from the inside of important firms, is needed. Considering their outsized importance on the global economy as well as global cities, it is a little surprising such books aren’t more common.

The review is fairly favorable, calling the book “accessible” and “clearly written.” However, the review doesn’t hint at criticism of Goldman Sachs. Given the opinions of many sociologists, is that would many sociologists would expect when reading such a book?